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Abstract
This paper considers a Ramsey model of linear capital and labor income
taxation in which a benevolent government cannot commit ex-ante to a
sequence of taxes for the future. In this setup, if the government is allowed
to borrow and lend to the consumers, the optimal capital income tax is
zero in the long run. This result stands in marked contrast with the recent
literature on optimal taxation without commitment, which imposes budget
balance and typically nds that the optimal capital income tax does not
converge to zero. Since it is e¢ cient to backload incentives, breaking
budget balance allows the government to generate surplus that reduces its
debt or increases its assets over time until the lack of commitment is no
longer binding and the economy is back in the full commitment solution.
Therefore, while the lack of commitment does not change the optimal
capital tax in the long run, it may impose an upper bound on the level of
long run debt.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the issue of optimal capital and labor income taxation when
the government cannot commit to future taxes. By allowing the government
to borrow and lend from households, the model generates results substantially
di¤erent from the ones found by the previous literature on taxation without
commitment. The reason for this is that governments with more assets need to
use less distortionary taxation, which means that the incentive to default can
be reduced by allowing asset accumulation.
A traditional question in the optimal taxation literature concerns the extent
to which capital taxes should be used to nance public spending. While in
the short run it is optimal to tax capital to collect costless revenue from a
sunk investment, in the long run using this source of taxation will distort the
accumulation of capital. Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) show that in an
economy of innitely lived agents capital taxes lead to intertemporal distortions
that compound over time, creating an innite wedge between marginal utility
in di¤erent periods. Therefore, in the long run, the capital income tax should
asymptote to zero.
It has been believed the result of zero capital taxes in the long run critically
hinges on the ability of the government to commit ex-ante to a sequence of future
taxes. Namely, Judd (1985) says that his "results indicate that redistribution
of income through capital income taxation is e¤ective only if it is unanticipated
and will persist only if policy-makers cannot commit themselves to low taxation
in the long run." Later work by Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) and Phelan
and Stachetti (2001) conrms this intuition by nding that when commitment
binds, the long run capital tax will not be zero. Using numerical simulations,
Fernadez-Villaverde and Tsyvinsky (2002) nd that, in general, commitment
will bind if the government is impatient enough, since the future reward of a
better equilibrium will not be enough to prevent the government from deviating
from the predened plan. However, all these papers assume that the government
has to keep budget balance in each period.
This paper shows that if instead the government is allowed to borrow and
lend to consumers, the optimal capital tax still converges to zero in the long
run, as in the full commitment case. The reason for this is that a government
with a large amount of assets will not have an incentive to default since it does
not need to use much distortionary taxation to nance its spending. Thus,
governments can use asset accumulation (or debt reduction) as a commitment
device for the future. As long as commitment binds, there will be an incentive
to increase the governments assets. This is consistent with the result found
independently by Dominguez (2006), who analyzes the model in Benhabib and
Rustichini (1997) for the case where bonds are allowed but the value of default
is exogenous and depends only on capital.
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Although the economy without commitment converges to a steady state
where commitment does not bind and capital income taxes are zero, some
steady states that were feasible in the economy with commitment will never
be reached without commitment. If the economy with commitment converged
to a steady state with high government debt that is no longer sustainable with-
out commitment, then in the economy without commitment the government
will have to accumulate more assets in the short run and will converge to a new
steady state with lower debt. Hence, while the lack of commitment does not
change the optimal capital tax in the long run, it may impose an upper bound
on the long run level of debt.
A rather unexpected consequence of the lack of commitment is that capital
levels will tend to be higher in the long run when there is no commitment.
This happens because the government has to accumulate assets to overcome its
commitment problem and will therefore be richer in the long run. This allows
labor taxes to be lower, which in turn increases labor supply. Higher labor will
make capital more productive, which implies that capital will also be higher in
steady state.
An interesting feature of the short run dynamics is that as long as commit-
ment binds, capital may either be taxed or subsidized, depending on whether
increasing capital makes the commitment constraint slacker or tighter. Numer-
ical simulations will show an example where capital is being subsidized in the
short run, so that the capital level is higher in the economy without commitment
at all times.
On a more technical side, this paper provides a setup where the worst sus-
tainable equilibrium can be determined in advance. Benhabib and Rustichini
(1997) derive the best policy without commitment assuming that the worst pun-
ishment is known. Phelan and Stachetti (2001) argue that this is not always
the case since the governments incentive constraint usually binds in the worst
equilibrium, which means that the worst punishment has to be determined en-
dogenously. This paper provides a su¢ cient condition for these two approaches
to be equivalent. If the government is allowed to make lump sum transfers to
consumers, which is a common assumption in most taxation models, then it is
always credible to give the households the worst possible expectations regard-
ing future capital taxes, since it is incentive compatible for the government to
tax the initial sunk capital at maximal rates, given that any remaining revenue
can be redistributed to consumers as a lump sum transfer. Thus, no incentives
need to be given for the government to act according to consumersexpecta-
tions, which means that the continuation of a worst equilibrium is still a worst
equilibrium in this model, which allows us to determine the worst sustainable
equilibrium in advance, as was assumed in Benhabib and Rustichini (1997).
We can interpret the long run results in this paper as an example of back-
loading of incentives, which is also present in models of commitment in other
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settings, such as Kocherlakota (1996), Ray (2002), or Acemoglu, Golosov and
Tsyvinsky (2005). The idea is that in order to make the governments choice
incentive compatible at all points in time, it is optimal to provide rewards as
far o¤ in the future as possible, since this provides incentives in all periods
until then. Here, in particular, the backloading of incentives is achieved by
letting the government increase its assets until the lack of commitment stops
binding. This mechanism was not allowed by previous models that imposed
budget balance.
This paper is also related to the work of Klein and Rios-Rull (2002), Klein,
Krusell and Rios-Rull (2004), Klein, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2005), and Klein,
Krusell and Rios-Rull (2006), who look at time consistent Markov equilibria
in taxation models. Since Markov equilibria preclude the use of trigger strate-
gies, the set of equilibria that can be implemented is signicantly smaller and in
general a steady state with zero capital taxes will not be optimal even if the gov-
ernment is allowed to break budget balance. An exception to this is provided by
Azzimonti-Renzo, Sarte and Soares (2006), where zero capital and labor income
taxes are reached in the long run by collecting enough capital taxes in the initial
periods to nance all future government spending. Although this paper reaches
somewhat similar conclusions to ours, the mechanism at work is not the same.
In Azzimonti-Renzo, Sarte and Soares (2006), capital accumulation occurs be-
cause in the short run capital is sunk, and it is in the governments best interest
to use non distortionary taxation to nance future spending. As a consequence,
asset accumulation will not stop until the government has enough assets to -
nance all future spending. Here, on the other hand, asset accumulation is used
to make the future without default better, so that the incentive to default is
reduced. Thus, asset accumulation stops when the incentive constraint for the
government stops binding, which happens before the governments asset limit
is reached, which means there is still positive labor taxation in the long run.
Furthermore, along the transition path the predictions of the two models are
signicantly di¤erent, since here capital may even be subsidized in the short
run if higher capital levels loosen the governments incentive constraint.
The game played between households and the government builds on the
stream of literature developed by Chari and Kehoe (1990) on sustainable equi-
libria, which allows a more parsimonious denition of subgame perfect equilibria
when some agents are too small to behave strategically. Chari and Kehoe (1993a
and 1993b) use a setup without capital to model debt default. They allow for
government default, but they either assume that households can commit to
their debt, or debt repayment cannot be enforced at all. This paper, on the
other hand, allows households to default, but it also allows the government to
punish them if they do so, which makes household default non trivial.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model with commitment
and derives the optimal ex-ante plan for the government. Section 3 relaxes the
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assumption of commitment and characterizes the set of sustainable equilibria
without commitment. Section 4 derives the best sustainable equilibrium under
no commitment and analyses its long run properties. Section 5 presents a
numerical example with short run dynamics and steady state results. Section
6 concludes with a brief summary of the main ndings of the paper.
2 Taxation with Commitment
This section introduces the economy with commitment. It characterizes allo-
cations which are attainable under commitment for an arbitrary policy, which
will also be relevant when there is no commitment since, from the households
perspective, they will be best responding to the governments strategy, which
they take as given. The benchmark Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) result is
also derived.
2.1 Model Setup
The economy has a continuum of measure one of innitely lived identical con-
sumers, an arbitrary number of rms who behave competitively and a benevo-
lent government. Time is discrete.
2.1.1 Households
The householdsderive utility from consumption ct, labor nt, and consumption
of a public good gt. They discount the future at rate , with 0 <  < 1; so that
each consumers lifetime utility is given by
1P
t=0
t[u(ct; nt) + v(gt)]:
Assume u is increasing in consumption and decreasing in labor and glob-
ally concave. The usual Inada conditions hold uc(0; n) = 1; uc(1; n) = 0;
un(c; 0) = 0 and un(c;1) =  1. Assume also that the utility of the public
good v is increasing and concave with v0(0) =1 and v0(1) = 0.
For each unit of work, households receive after tax wages of wt(1 nt ). The
labor tax can take any real value. Households can transfer consumption between
periods using capital kt or government bonds bt. At time t  1 households buy
capital kt. Each unit of capital costs one unit of consumption good. At time
t households can rent this capital to rms for which they receive an after tax
return of Rt(1   kt ).For simplicity, assume that capital is fully depreciated.
If capital were depreciated at rate  < 1, which may be irreversible, all the
results in the paper remain unchanged. Steady state simulations will illustrate
the e¤ect of introducing irreversible capital. Assume households can always
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choose not to use their capital, so that capital taxes cannot be higher than
one kt  1. No lower bound on kt is imposed. A bond that pays one unit of
consumption good in period t costs qt 1 units of consumption good in period
t 1. Households may also receive lump sum transfers from the government Tt,
which must always be positive.
The householdsper period budget constraint is thus given by
ct + kt+1 + qtbt+1  Rt(1  kt )kt + bt + wt(1  nt )nt + Tt:
They must also meet the following no Ponzi condition
lim
t!1

bt+1
Qt
0 qs
  0:
2.1.2 Government
The government is benevolent, which means that it maximizes the utility of a
representative consumer. It needs to collect revenue to nance expenditure in
the public good gt every period. It sets proportional taxes on labor nt and
capital kt each period. It transfers revenues between periods using government
bonds bt. The government sets the bond price qt and consumers decide how
many bonds to purchase. The government can make positive lump sum transfers
to the households Tt  0. Given this, the governments per period budget
constraint is given by
gt + bt + Tt = wt
n
t nt +Rt
k
t kt + qtbt+1:
2.1.3 Firms
Each period rms maximize prots given the before taxes prices for labor wt
and capital Rt. They have access to the production function F (kt; nt); which
has constant returns to scale and decreasing marginal productivity of capital
and labor. Assume Fk(0; n) =1; Fn(k; 0) =1; and Fk(1; n) < 1=:
2.1.4 Market equilibrium
Market must clear every period. For the goods market, this means that the
resource constraint must be met every period
ct + gt + kt+1 = F (kt; nt):
Factor markets clear when factor prices equal the marginal productivity of
each factor: wt = Fn(kt; nt) and Rt = Fk(kt; nt).
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2.2 Allocations Attainable under Commitment
Consider the commitment economy in which the government makes all its deci-
sions for the future at the beginning of time. Households make their decisions
after observing the policy plan decided by the government.
Let  = (0; 1; :::) denote the sequence of government policies t = (kt ; 
n
t ;
Tt; qt; gt); let x = (x0; x1; :::) denote the sequence of allocations xt = (ct; nt; kt+1;
bt+1), and let p = (p0; p1; :::) denote the sequence of market clearing prices
pt = (Rt; wt):
An allocation x is attainable under commitment if there are policies  and
prices p such that (i) households maximize utility subject to their budget con-
straints and no Ponzi condition, (ii) the government meets its budget constraint
with Tt  0 and, (iii) factor prices equal marginal productivity of factors and
the resource constraint is met.
Following the approach developed by Lucas and Stokey (1983), we can plug
the rst order condition for the householdsproblem into the householdsbud-
get constraint and obtain the economys implementability condition. Lemma
1 shows that an allocation is attainable under equilibrium if and only if it
meets the implementability condition and the resource constraint, as well as a
transversality condition. Lemma 1 is proven in the appendix.
Lemma 1 An allocation x is attainable under commitment if and only if it
meets the following conditions for t  0
m(ct; nt) + at+1  at
ct + gt + kt+1 = F (kt; nt)
lim
t!1
tat+1 = 0
given k0 and a0 = uc(c0; n0)[Fk(k0; n0)(1   k0)k0 + b0], with m(ct; nt) and at
given by
m(ct; nt)  uc(ct; nt)ct + un(ct; nt)nt
at  uc(ct; nt)

uc(ct 1; nt 1)
uc(ct; nt)
kt + bt

for t > 0:
Using a change of variables, we have replaced the level of government bonds
for the value of consumer assets at. This will allow us to write the problem
recursively using as state variables the level of capital and the value of consumer
assets. This approach builds on Werning (2003), who rewrites the problem in
Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppala (2002) using the value of debt and the
state of an exogenous Markov process as state variables.
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The capital and labor income taxes associated with a given allocation x are
determined by
kt+1 = 1 
1
Fk(kt+1; nt+1)
uc(ct; nt)
uc(ct+1; nt+1)
nt = 1 +
1
Fn(kt; nt)
un(ct; nt)
uc(ct; nt)
:
We can guarantee that the transversality condition limtat+1 = 0 is met
by constraining a to always be below the natural debt limit a(kt) which is the
maximum debt level that can be repaid by the government
a(kt)  max
c;n;k
1P
s=t
s tm(cs; ns) st cs + ks+1  F (ks; ns):
From now on the implementability condition and the resource constraint will
be used as necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an allocation to be attainable
under commitment with the underlying condition that at must remain below
this upper bound.
This characterization of allocations attainable under commitment will be
useful to determine the optimal policies with or without commitment since in
both cases the resulting allocations will have to be chosen by households who
anticipate a given set of policies, which means that their outcomes must be
attainable under commitment.
2.3 Optimal Taxes with Commitment
This section derives the optimal policy plan when the government can choose the
policies for all future periods at time zero. It introduces a recursive formulation
of the problem (that will also be used for the no commitment case) to derive
the benchmark Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) result of zero capital taxes in
the long run.
The Ramsey problem chooses among all the allocations attainable under
commitment, the one that maximizes the welfare of the representative con-
sumer. The outcome of a Ramsey equilibrium is a sequence x that maximizes
the present value of utility
P1
t=0 
t[u(ct; nt) + v(gt)] subject to x being at-
tainable under commitment and given an initial stock of capital k0 > 0 and
an initial promise for the value of consumer assets a0 < a(k0). This formu-
lation assumes that the initial planner has committed to a given a0. If in-
stead we wanted to assume that the government had an initial outstanding
debt of b0 we would have to add the following restriction for the initial period
a0 = uc(c0; n0)[Fk(k0; n0)(1  k0)k0+ b0]. Given this, we can write the Ramsey
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problem using the following sequence formulation
V (k0; a0)  max
c;n;g;k;a
1P
t=0
t[u(ct; nt) + v(gt)]
subject to m(ct; nt) + at+1  at
ct + gt + kt+1 = F (kt; nt):
Using a and k as state variables this problem can be written recursively in
the following way
V (k; a) = max
c;n;g;k;a
[u(c; n) + v(g) + V (k0; a0)]
subject to m(c; n) + a0  a
c+ g + k0  F (k; n):
If m(c; n) is concave, then the constraint set is convex, which means that
the value function V (k; a) will be concave, and the rst order conditions are
necessary and su¢ cient for optimality. If this condition is not met, rst order
conditions are still necessary for an optimum, but no longer su¢ cient, since it is
also necessary to verify that the second order conditions are met to make sure
we are at a maximum.
Using  as the multiplier on the implementability condition and  as the
multiplier on the resource constraint, we can write the Lagrangean for this
problem in the following way
L = u(c; n) + v(g) + V (k0; a0) + [m(c; n) + a0   a]  [c+ g + k0   F (k; n)]:
Combining the rst order conditions for k0 and a0 with the envelope condi-
tions for k and a, we get the following equations
(k) Vk(k; a) = Fk(k; n)Vk(k
0; a0)
(a) Va(k
0; a0) = Va(k; a):
A steady state for the Ramsey economy has constant c, n, g, k and a as well
as constant multipliers  and . From the optimality condition for k, it is clear
that in steady state Fk = 1. Plugging into the expression for capital taxes, it
is straightforward to see that capital taxes must be zero in steady state
k = 1  1
Fk
uc
u0c
= 0:
Labor taxes, on the other hand, will remain positive in steady state
nt = 1 +
1
Fn
un
uc
:
This is the well known Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) result that capital
income taxes converge to zero in the long run.
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3 Sustainable Equilibria without Commitment
This section introduces lack of commitment by modelling the taxation problem
as a game where the government and the agents in the economy make sequen-
tial decisions every period. The equilibrium concept is dened and a simple
characterization of equilibrium outcomes is formalized based on a maximum
threat point of reversion to the worst equilibrium, in the spirit of Abreu (1988).
3.1 Game Setup
This section introduces a game where the lack of commitment is modelled ex-
plicitly and the value of default that sustains the initial plan is determined
endogenously. Since households and rms behave competitively, whereas the
government behaves strategically, I will use the notion of sustainable equilibria
introduced by Chari and Kehoe (1990), where all strategies are conditional on
the past history of the governments actions.
Chari and Kehoe (1993a and 1993b) model debt default in a setup without
capital. Both papers allow the government to defult on its bonds. In Chari
and Kehoe (1993a) it is assumed that households can always commit to repay
their debt. Conversely, in Chari and Kehoe (1993b) it is assumed that house-
holds cannot commit to their debt, which means that debt repayment cannot
be enforced at all, leading to no loans being made to households in equilibrium.
By introducing an endogenous punishment for default, we now make the house-
holdsdefault decision non trivial since they will only default if they expect not
to get punished harshly enough.
Assume that the government cannot commit to future taxes and transfers.
Furthermore, both households and the government can default on their bonds.
The government can punish consumers who defaulted. Namely, each period
the government chooses Pt  0, which is the utility loss that consumers who
defaulted in the previous period experience. Let dgt be an indicator function for
whether the government defaults and dct be the percentage of consumers who
defaulted in period t.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the
government decides by how much to punish consumers who defaulted in the
previous period, whether to default on its bonds, and which taxes and trans-
fers to set for the current period. Note that the government does not need to
know which households defaulted; it is su¢ cient that the government knows
the percentage of households who defaulted. Since each household has mass
zero, the action of a nite number of households does not a¤ect the percentage
of households defaulting, which means that they are still non strategic. To put
the punishment into practice the government will then rely on an outside inde-
pendent institution (maybe courts) which will be able to punish each defaulting
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household.
After the government has made its choices, allocations and prices are jointly
determined by the householdsand the rmsmaximization problems at market
clearing prices.
3.2 Strategies
The governments actions in period t now include the punishment and decision
to default, so that the expanded vector of governments actions is now t =
(kt ; 
n
t ; Tt; qt; gt; d
g
t ; Pt).
Each period, every household chooses how much to consume, work and in-
vest in capital and bonds. It also decides whether to default on its debt. Let dcit
be an indicator function for whether household i chooses to default in period t.
The vector of individual decisions in each period is Xit = (c
i
t; n
i
t; k
i
t+1; b
i
t+1; d
ci
t ).
The vector of aggregate choices that results from the households decisions is
Xt = (ct; nt; kt+1; bt+1; d
c
t), where the aggregate value of each aggregate variable
is the integral over all the households in the economy of the individual variables.
In equilibrium, since all households are identical and follow pure strategies, the
aggregate action will be the same as each individual action.
The price vector is pt = (Rt; wt) as before.
Let ht be the history of government decisions until time t so that ht =
(0; :::;t). Following Chari and Kehoe (1990), all the strategies in the game
will be contingent only on this history, since households are innitesimal and
have no power to inuence Xt, which means that they will not behave strategi-
cally. Thus, knowing the householdsstrategies and governments actions until
time t is enough to characterize all the history until then.
The strategy for the government is given by . The strategy for each period
t is a mapping from the history ht 1 into the governments decision space t, so
that t = t(ht 1). When choosing a given strategy, the government anticipates
that histories will evolve according to ht = (ht 1; t(ht 1)). Let t denote the
sequence of government strategies from time t onwards.
The strategy for a representative household is given by f . The strategy for
each period t is a mapping from the history ht into the householdsdecision
space Xt, so that Xt = Xit = ft(ht). Let f
t denote the sequence of household
strategies from time t onwards.
Firms and markets jointly work as a third player that has strategy  map-
ping the history ht into the vector of factor prices pt, so that pt = (ht). Let
f t denote the sequence of household strategies from time t onwards.
In the next section we will specify how each player chooses its strategy in a
sustainable equilibrium.
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3.3 Sustainable Equilibrium
At time t, the government and households choose an action for time t and a
contingent plan for the future. This is equivalent to choosing an action for
today while anticipating future behavior since both the government and house-
holds have time consistent preferences, which means that the plan they choose
today will be optimal tomorrow. The problem solved by the government and
households at time t is described below.
For every history ht 1, given allocation rule f and pricing rule , the gov-
ernment chooses t to maximize the present value of utility
1P
s=t
s t[u(cs(hs); ns(hs)) + v(gs(hs 1))  dct(hs 1)Ps(hs 1)]
subject to
g(hs 1) + Ts(hs 1) = ws(hs)ns (hs 1)ns(hs) +Rs(hs)
k
s(hs 1)ks(hs 1) +
qt(hs 1)bs+1(hs)  bs(hs 1)(1  dct(hs))(1  dgt (hs 1))
Ts(hs 1)  0
and realizing that future histories are induced by t according to hs = (hs 1; s(hs 1)).
For every history ht, given policy rule  (and the histories it induces) and
pricing rule , each household chooses f t to maximize the present value of
utility
1P
s=t
s t[u(cis(hs); n
i
s(hs))  dcit (hs 1)Ps(hs 1)]
subject to
cis(hs) = ws(hs)(1  ns (hs 1))nis(hs) + Ts(hs 1) +
bis(hs 1)(1  dcit (hs))(1  dgs(hs 1))  qs(hs 1)bis+1(hs) +
Rs(hs)(1  ks(hs 1))kis(hs 1)  kis+1(hs):
Market clearing and rm optimality require that for every history ht rm
demand must equal household supply for every production factor, which hap-
pens when factor prices equal their marginal productivity, so that t(ht) is given
by
wt(ht) = Fn(kt(ht 1); nt(ht))
Rt(ht) = Fk(kt(ht 1); nt(ht)):
A sustainable equilibrium is a triplet (; f; ) that satises the following
conditions: (i) given f and , the continuation of contingent policy plan 
solves the governments problem for every history ht 1; (ii) given  and , the
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continuation of contingent allocation rule f solves the householdsproblem for
every history ht; (iii) given f and , the continuation of the contingent pricing
rule  is such that factor prices equal marginal productivity for every history
ht.
3.4 Worst Sustainable Equilibrium
Let V (; f; ) denote the present value of utility that results from a sustainable
equilibrium (; f; ). Then the worst sustainable equilibrium is the sustainable
equilibrium that leads to the lowest value V (; f; ). It will be useful to nd the
worst sustainable equilibrium to then dene which equilibria can be sustained
without ex-ante commitment, since the worst sustainable equilibrium is the
worst punishment that can be credibly inicted on a government that deviates
from a predened plan.
Lemma 2 The value of the worst sustainable equilibrium only depends on the
current capital level: V (w; fw; w) = V w(k):
A proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix. The idea is that the
value of a worst equilibrium can only depend on the current payo¤ relevant
variables. Furthermore, since the government can eliminate debt by defaulting,
no additional punishment can be given to it, which means that the value of the
worst sustainable equilibrium will not depend on the level of debt.
For our model the worst sustainable equilibrium is an equilibrium where all
agents default on their debt and the government always expropriates capital.
The default equilibrium is a triplet (d; fd; d) where agents have the fol-
lowing strategies:
(i) The government always defaults on bt, never punishes consumers, always
taxes capital at conscatory rates, and sets qt = 0. Transfers and labor taxes
implement the solution to the following problem
max
ct;nt;gt
[u(ct; nt) + v(gt)]
subject to m(ct; nt)  0
ct + gt = F (kt; nt)
(ii) Households default if bt < 0, never invest in capital, and never lend
or borrow from the government. Labor and consumption solve the following
problem
max
ct;nt
u(ct; nt)
subject to ct = Tt + wt(1  nt )nt
(iii) Factor prices equal marginal productivity of factors.
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Lemma 3 The default equilibrium is the worst sustainable equilibrium:
V (w; fw; w) = V w(k) = V d(k):
The worst sustainable equilibrium punishes the government by giving house-
holds beliefs about the governments future behavior that lead to low future
value. However, these beliefs have to be correct, so the government has to be
given incentives to keep the plan. Phelan and Stachetti show that in general
the governments incentive constraint will be binding, which means the contin-
uation value of a worst sustainable equilibrium will not be a worst sustainable
equilibrium. However, since we allow the government to make lump sum trans-
fers to the households, even when the government gives households extremely
pessimistic beliefs that capital will be fully expropriated in the following period,
the governments incentive constraint will not bind since it is always willing to
tax capital at maximal rates and then redistribute back to the households.
Since households always expect the government to fully expropriate capital,
they will never invest even though capital is very productive. Furthermore,
if any household actually invests, it will be in the governments best interest
to expropriate it since capital is sunk ex-post. Thus, this lack of commitment
will lead to an extremely ine¢ cient investment decision. Since both households
and the government are best responding to each others strategy, the default
equilibrium is sustainable. The appendix proves that the default equilibrium is
the worst sustainable equilibrium.
Since the best the government can do when households are playing a default
equilibrium is to maximize its per period utility, the ow utility reached in a
period when the initial stock of capital is k is given by
Ud(k) = max
c;n;g
[u(c; n) + v(g)] st m(c; n)  0, c+ g = F (k; n)
and the net present value of a default equilibrium is
V d(k) = Ud(k) +

1  U
d(0);
which only depends on the initial level of k.
3.5 Characterization of Sustainable Outcomes
In the spirit of Abreus optimal punishments, we will use reversion to the worst
sustainable equilibrium as the maximum threat point that allows us to sustain
equilibria. Thus, for an equilibrium to be sustainable, it must yield higher
utility than the worst sustainable equilibrium in all future dates. We are using
the terminology of Abreu (1988), who denes optimal punishments when rms
deviate in a cartel. Here, there is not any kind of collusion per se, but we
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still need to enforce cooperation since the governments ex-ante and ex-post
incentives are not aligned. Thus, the worst punishment is not inicted by other
rms, but rather by changing the consumers expectations, which leads to a
di¤erent equilibrium that is worse for everyone.
The next lemma characterizes the entire set of sustainable equilibrium out-
comes, which are the allocations that are induced by a particular sustainable
equilibrium.
Lemma 4 An allocation x is the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium if and
only if:
(i) x is attainable under commitment
(ii) the continuation value of x is always better than the worst sustainable
equilibrium
1P
t=i
t i[u(ct; nt) + v(gt)]  V d(ki):
The proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix. The idea is that
for an allocation to be the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium, it is neces-
sary that households and rms are optimizing given the governments strategy,
which means that the resulting allocation must be attainable under commit-
ment. Government optimality requires that it is never in the governments best
interest to deviate. Since the worst punishment after a deviation is V d(k);
this gives us a lower bound on the utility that can be reached in a sustainable
equilibrium at any point in time.
4 Best Sustainable Equilibrium
Now that the set of sustainable equilibria has been characterized, we turn to
nding among these, the one that maximizes the initial welfare for the society
for given initial conditions for k0 and a0. As before, assuming commitment to a
given a0 in the initial period is a a simplifying assumption that can be relaxed.
Assume that a0 is within the necessary bounds for an equilibrium to exist.
4.1 Sequence Approach
The outcome of the best sustainable equilibrium solves
V (k0; a0) = max
c;n;g;k;a
1P
t=0
t[u(ct; nt) + v(gt)]
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subject to m(ct; nt) + at+1  at
ct + gt + kt+1 = F (kt; nt)
1P
t=i
t i[u(ct; nt) + v(gt)]  V d(ki):
This follows directly from lemma 4. Since the three restrictions are necessary
and su¢ cient for a sustainable equilibrium, then the allocation that maximizes
welfare subject to them must be the outcome of the best sustainable equilibrium.
This formulation is equivalent to the Ramsey problem under commitment,
with an additional incentive compatibility condition that ensures that, at each
point in time, the government never wants to deviate from the predened plan.
Notice that one of our restrictions now has an endogenous function V d(ki),
which is concave. Given this, the constraint set may not be convex, even if we
assumed that m(ct; nt) is concave. Thus, we cannot guarantee that V (k; a) is
a concave function. In the analysis that follows we proceed as if V (k; a) were
concave. The appendix shows that the same results follow through even if that
is not the case.
Let xfb(k0)  argmax
P1
t=0 
t[u(ct; nt)+ v(gt)] st ct+ gt+ kt+1 = F (kt; nt)
be the rst best allocation when the economy has initial capital k0:
Then the implementability constraint will not be binding for a0  a(k0),
which is dened by a(k0) 
P1
t=0 
tm(cfbt (k0); n
fb
t (k0)).
Notice that V fb(k)  V (k; a(k)) > V d(k), which means that if the imple-
mentability condition is not binding, then the incentive compatibility condition
will not bind either. The reason for this is straightforward: if the government
does not have to use distortionary taxation to nance its spending, then it has
no incentive to deviate from the optimal plan.
Since the implementability condition is not binding for a0  a(k0), then
having lower a0 does not bring any additional benet to the economy, which
means that Va(k; a) = 0 for a  a(k): On the other hand, if a > a(k), then
starting o¤with a lower a0 relaxes the implementability condition, which implies
that Va(k; a) < 0 for a > a(k).
4.2 Recursive Approach
The program to nd the best sustainable equilibrium can also be written re-
cursively as stated below. The appendix shows that the two formulations are
equivalent, and from now on the recursive approach will be used.
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V (k; a) = max
c;n;g;k;a
[u(c; n) + v(g) + V (k0; a0)]
subject to m(c; n) + a0  a
c+ g + k0 = F (k; n)
V (k0; a0)  V d(k0)
The Lagrangean for this problem is
L = u(c; n) + v(g) + V (k0; a0) + [m(c; n) + a0   a]
 [c+ g + k0   F (k; n)] + [V (k0; a0)  V d(k0)]:
Combining the rst order conditions for k0 and a0 with the envelope condi-
tions for k and a, we get the following equations
(k0) Vk(k0; a0) =
Vk(k; a)
Fk(k; n)
+ [V dk (k
0)  Vk(k0; a0)]:
(a0) Va(k0; a0)(1 + ) = Va(k; a):
The optimality condition for k shows how the lack of commitment can dis-
tort the choice of capital in the short run. If commitment binds ( > 0) and
the value of default reacts more to changes in capital than the value of the
optimal sustainable plan, then capital will be distorted downward, since this
will help loosen the incentive compatibility constraint. If conversely, the value
of the optimal sustainable plan varies more with capital, than capital will be
distorted upward. Thus, if higher capital makes commitment less binding, it
will be optimal to subsidize capital. This result is reminiscent of the ndings
of Benhabib and Rustichini (1997), who show that it could be optimal to ei-
ther tax or subsidize capital. However, here this will only be true in the short
run, since in the long run the economy will converge to a steady state where
commitment does not bind.
The optimality condition for a says that it is optimal for the value of gov-
ernment assets to decrease over time as long as commitment is binding, which
leads to an increase of government assets over time. The reason for this is
that when the government accumulates assets, it gets a direct benet of higher
utility tomorrow, as well as an additional benet from loosening the incentive
compatibility condition in the future. Thus, to some extent, government as-
sets work as a commitment mechanism that reduces the incentive to default by
increasing the welfare of the equilibrium strategy.
The next section describes the long run properties of the economy without
commitment.
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4.3 Steady State
In this section we derive the papers main result that capital taxes must converge
to zero in the long run. We start by showing that any steady state must have
zero capital taxes and then show that the economy will indeed converge to a
steady state.
Proposition 1 (Zero capital taxes in steady state) In steady state, the
best sustainable equilibrium has zero capital taxes.
Proof. Assume the economy is in a steady state with constant c, n, g, k, and
a. The rst order conditions for c and n (uc+mc =  and un+mn =  =Fn)
imply that  and  must also be constant. We can now prove by contradiction
that capital taxes cannot be di¤erent from zero in the long run.
If capital taxes are not zero, then Fk(k; n) 6= 1. From the optimality condi-
tion for k derived above, this implies that  > 0 (recall that   0 since it is the
multiplier on an inequality constraint). We can see in the optimality condition
for a that when  > 0, it must be true that Va(k; a) = 0 is equal to zero in steady
state. But then it must be true that a  a(k) and V (a; k) = V fb(k) > V d(k),
which means that the incentive compatibility condition cannot be binding and
we must have  = 0, which means we have reached a contradiction and capital
taxes cannot be di¤erent from zero in steady state.
Proposition 2 (Convergence to steady state) The best sustainable equi-
librium converges to a steady state.
Proof. The rst order conditions describe the unique path for the economy
for given initial conditions.
If  converges to zero, then the long run dynamics of capital and a are like
those of an economy without commitment, which are governed by
Vk(k
0; a0) =
Vk(k; a)
Fk(k; n)
Va(k
0; a0) = Va(k; a):
This means that capital will increase as long as it is below its steady state
level (Fk > 1) and increase when it is above the steady state level (Fk < 1),
so that it converges to its steady state.
If  does not converge to zero, then Va(k; a) must converge to zero since
 is weakly positive and Va(k0; a0)(1 + ) = Va(k; a). But we have just seen
that when Va(k; a) is close to zero, the implementability condition cannot be
binding, which means that  must converge to zero.
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As long as commitment is binding, increasing government savings not only
increases tomorrows continuation value, but also loosens the incentive compat-
ibility constraint. Thus, the government will keep saving until it has achieved
enough assets for the incentive compatibility to stop binding. This will happen
before the government reaches its asset limit, since V (a(k); k) > V d(k).
We have seen so far that without commitment the economy will still converge
to a steady state where commitment does not bind. Next we explore the long
run implications that the lack of commitment may have.
With commitment, a steady state had to meet the following conditions
un + mn =  Fn uc + mc = 
c+ g + k = F (k; n) vg = 
[m(c; n)  a(1  )] = 0 Fk = 1
Without commitment, any steady state commitment still has to meet the
previous conditions, but it also has to meet the incentive compatibility condition
V (k; a) =
1
1   [u(c; n) + v(g)]  V
d(k):
Thus, all steady states without commitment are also steady states under
commitment. However, the converse need not be true. In particular, steady
states with a very indebted government (which translates into a high level of
a) need to use more distortionary taxation, which reduces the present value
of utility, so that the incentive compatibility condition may not hold. As one
would expect, more indebted governments have a higher incentive to default.
Conversely, steady states where the government has a substantial amount of as-
sets do not need to use much distortionary taxation, which reduces the incentive
to default and expropriate capital.
5 Numerical Simulations
To illustrate the results of the model, consider an economy with preferences
given by
u(c; n) + v(g) = ln(c)  n1+=(1 + ) + ln(g)
and production function
F (k; n) = Akn1  +Bn+ Ck;
where the specic parameters are  = 1;  = 0:4; A = 2; B = 0:5; C = 0:5; and
 = 0:5:
We will start by looking at the short run dynamics of this economy for given
initial conditions, in order to see how the lack of commitment changes the path
towards the steady state and what welfare costs it entails.
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Next, we turn too see how commitment changes the feasible steady states
of this economy, in order to infer what the long run implications of lack of
commitment are.
5.1 Short Run Dynamics
The recursive problem can be written as
V (k; a) = max
k0;a0

U(k; a; k0a0) + V (k0; a0)
	
subject to V (k0; a0)  V d(k0)
where U(k; a; k0a0) is given by
U(k; a; k0a0) =max
c;n;g
[u(c; n) + v(g)]
subject to m(c; n) + a0  a
c+ g + k0 = F (k; n):
The rst step of the simulation is to construct U(k; a; k0a0). For computa-
tional convenience, it is useful to stack the state variables for each period into
one single dimension. If we exclude initial conditions where the implementabil-
ity condition is not binding, we can assume, without loss of generality, that the
implementability condition holds with equality. Given this and the previous as-
sumptions for the functional form, we can write the implementability condition
as 1   n1+ + a0  a, which means we can solve for n(k; a; k0a0), which is a
matrix that gives us the optimal choice of n for a given state today on one axis
and a given state tomorrow on the other axis. Given the functional form for
utility it is optimal to have g = c. Thus, we can use the resource constraint to
nd g(k; a; k0a0) and c(k; a; k0a0). Finally, we can use these matrices to compute
U(k; a; k0a0) = u[c(k; a; k0a0); n(k; a; k0a0)] + v[g(k; a; k0a0)]:
Given this, we can make an initial guess for V (k; a) and iterate on it until
we nd a xed point. For the case where there is no commitment, this itera-
tion includes a large punishment when the incentive compatibility constraint is
violates. This ensures that for the chosen solution the constraint is always met.
Figure I shows the optimal path for an economy with initial capital stock
k0 = 0:1 and an initial promise for the value of consumer assets a0 = 1:3.
Dashed lines represent the economy with commitment, whereas the solid lines
represent the no-commitment economy.
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Figure I - Transition Dynamics with and without Commitment
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For the parameter values we have assumed, capital is being subsidized when
the incentive compatibility is binding. This reects the fact that the value of
the best equilibrium is more sensitive to changes in the level of capital than the
worst equilibrium. Thus, increasing capital relaxes the incentive compatibility
condition.
In the economy without commitment, the value of a also decreases in initial
periods (which is equivalent to reducing the governments debt) so that, in the
future, labor taxes are lower and labor and capital levels are higher without
commitment.
As a consequence, capital levels are higher in the economy without commit-
ment both in the short run (due to the capital subsidy) and in the long run
(due to lower labor taxes).
The initial value of welfare in the economy with commitment is  5:57,
whereas, for the economy without commitment, initial welfare is  5:82. This
di¤erence represents the cost of lack of commitment.
In the long run, however, the welfare in the economy without commitment
( 3:41) is higher than in the economy with commitment ( 4:08), since the
economy without commitment reduced its debt in the initial periods, which
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means that it does not have to do as much distortionary taxation in steady
state. Thus, while there is a short run cost to commitment, in the long run, an
economy whose government cannot commit ex-ante may actually have higher
welfare.
5.2 Long Run Implications
In the long run, commitment will not be binding even if the government can-
not commit to policies ex ante. Section 4.3 shows that steady states without
commitment are also steady states in the economy with commitment, albeit
with di¤erent initial conditions. However, the converse need not be true since,
without commitment, we cannot sustain steady state equilibria of the economy
with commitment where the incentive compatibility condition is not met. Thus,
introducing the inability of governments to commit can help us predict what
kinds of equilibria we might expect to nd.
Figure II plots the set of steady state equilibria under commitment, indexed
by the steady state level of capital. Notice that steady states with higher capital
also have lower a, which means that the government is less indebted. Thus,
V (k; a) increases with capital not only because capital is increasing but also
because a is decreasing. Labor and consumption are increasing with capital,
exactly because steady states with higher capital have lower labor taxes.
Figure II - Steady States achievable with and without Commitment
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To nd which steady states are still feasible when the government cannot
commit to future policies, the top panels plot the value of default associated with
the capital level that is chosen in each of the equilibria. The left panel shows the
value of default in our baseline model, whereas the right panel plots the value of
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default when the depreciated capital cannot be reconverted into consumption
goods. As would be expected, in the economy with irreversible capital, the
value of default is higher, but the qualitative results do not change1. Without
commitment, steady states must meet the incentive compatibility constraint
V (k; a)  V d(k), which means that only steady states with a high enough level
of capital are sustainable. In general, steady states where the government is
very indebted will not be feasible without commitment. In particular, when
governments approach their natural debt limit and need to tax labor income at
very distortionary levels, it becomes more likely that they will default on their
past promises.
6 Concluding Remarks
If the government is allowed to accumulate assets, then, even if it cannot com-
mit to a stream of future taxes, in the long run capital taxes will converge
to zero. The previous literature on taxation without commitment had found
that this was not the case when the government was forced to keep budget
balance in every period. The reason for this disparity is that, in the absence of
commitment, government assets can work as a commitment device to discipline
government behavior that was not available under budget balance.
Thus, in the short run, economies without commitment will tend to accumu-
late more assets. Furthermore, while commitment binds, capital may either be
taxed or subsidized, depending on whether increasing capital loosens or tightens
the governments incentive constraint.
In the long run, economies without commitment will tend to have a higher
asset level, which leads to higher capital levels since an economy with a richer
1 If capital depreciates at rate  and the non-depreciated capital is irreversible then capital
income taxes still converge to zero in the long run in the best sustainable equilibrium. The
more substantial di¤erence is that default is now more attractive, since in the default equi-
librium the level capital remains positive and only decreases as it depreciates, which does not
allow such as stark punishment as before. Let the value of a default equilibrium in this case
be given by V D(k).
The outcome of the best sustainable equilibrium solves
V (k; a) = max
c;n;g;k;a
[u(c; n) + v(g) + V (k0; a0)]
subject to m(c; n) + a0  a
c+ g + k0 = F (k; n) + (1  )kt
kt+1  (1  )kt
V (k0; a0)  V D(k0)
Since V D(k) is still lower than V fb(k) capital taxes are still zero in the long run.
The value for depreciation is  = 1 C, so that the steady state equilibria with commmitment
remain unchanged with or without irreversibility of capital.
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government will have lower labor taxes. This in turn increases labor, leading
to higher productivity of capital.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The intertemporal budget constraint can be written as
R0(1  k0)k0 + b0 
1P
t=0

(ct   wt(1  nt )nt   Tt)
Qt
0 qs

+ lim
t!1

(
kt+1
qt
+ bt+1)
Qt
0 qs

:
Since the marginal utility of consumption is always positive, it will always
be optimal for households to meet their budget constraint with equality and
to choose the long run values of k an b such that the last term in the budget
constraint is not positive, which would make it more binding.
Together with the no Ponzi condition and the non negativity constraint on
capital, this implies that the following transversality condition must be met
lim
t!1

(
kt+1
qt
+ bt+1)
Qt
0 qs

= 0:
Households thus solve the following problem
max
c;n;b;k
1P
t=0
tu(ct; nt)
ct   wt(1  nt )nt   Tt + kt+1 + qtbt+1 = Rt(1  kt )kt + bt
lim
t!1

(kt+1=qt + bt+1)
Qt
0 qs

= 0
ct; nt; kt+1  0; given k0 and b0:
Since we are maximizing a concave function on a convex set, the following
rst order conditions, together with the governments budget constraint and the
transversality condition, are necessary and su¢ cient for household optimality
un(ct; nt) + wt(1  nt )uc(ct; nt) = 0
kt+1[uc(ct; nt)  Rt+1(1  kt+1)uc(ct+1; nt+1)] = 0
qtuc(ct; nt)  uc(ct+1; nt+1) = 0:
Furthermore, the following conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for rm
optimality and market clearing
wt = Fn(kt; nt)
Rt = Fk(kt; nt)
ct + gt + kt+1 = F (kt; nt):
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Finally, the government has to meet the following constraints
gt + bt + Tt = wt
n
t nt +Rt
k
t kt + qtbt+1 and Tt  0:
Thus an allocation is attainable under commitment if and only if there are
prices and policies such that all the above conditions are met.
We can drop the governments budget constraint since the resource con-
straint and the households budget constraint jointly imply that the govern-
ments budget constraint is always met.
Multiplying the householdsbudget constraint by uc(ct; nt) and plugging in
the rst order condition leads to the following implementability condition
ctuc(ct; nt) + ntun(ct; nt) + uc(ct+1; nt+1)[
uc(ct; nt)
uc(ct+1; nt+1)
kt+1 + bt+1]
= uc(ct; nt)[
uc(ct 1; nt 1)
uc(ct; nt)
kt + bt] + Ttuc(ct; nt);
which can replace the householdsbudget constraint.
The only conditions that constrain the allocations achievable under com-
mitment are the implementability condition, the resource constraint, and the
transversality condition. All the remaining conditions can be met by choosing
prices and policies. Furthermore, all the initial conditions can be recovered
using this characterization of the economy. Thus, an allocation is attainable
under commitment if and only if it meets the following conditions
m(ct; nt) + at+1  at
ct + gt + kt+1 = F (kt; nt)
lim
t!1

tat+1

= 0
with at  uc(ct; nt)
h
uc(ct 1;nt 1)
uc(ct;nt)
kt + bt
i
for t > 0 and a0  uc(c0; n0)[Fk(k0; n0)
(1  k0)k0 + b0]:
The prices and policies that ensure that the remaining conditions are met
are the following
Tt = m(ct; nt) + at+1   at
wt = Fn(kt; nt)
Rt = Fk(kt; nt)
nt = 1 +
1
wt
un(ct; nt)
uc(ct; nt)
kt+1 = 1 
1
Rt
uc(ct; nt)
uc(ct+1; nt+1)
:
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7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The value of the worst sustainable equilibrium depends only on the payo¤ rel-
evant state variables, which are the current stock of capital and bonds, as well
the percentage of households who defaulted in the previous period.
Suppose that this is not the case and that there are two histories A and
B with the same k; b; and dc, but with V w(A) > V w(B). Then the value of
A could be decreased if all agents followed the strategies from equilibrium B,
which means it could not have been the worst equilibrium to begin with. Thus,
it must be true that V (w; fw; w) = V w(k; b; dc):
Since V w(k; b; 0) was the worst sustainable equilibrium when no consumers
defaulted in the previous period, if dc > 0 and the government decides not to
punish consumers, the welfare cannot be lower than V w(k; b; 0). This implies
the value of the worst sustainable equilibrium does not depend on whether
consumers defaulted in the previous period.
The value of the worst sustainable equilibrium is also independent of b. Since
V w(k; 0; dc) is the worst equilibrium when the government has no debt, then if
the government defaults on its debt no additional punishment can be given to
him, which means that V w(k; b; dc)  V w(k; 0; dc). If b < 0, then V w(k; b; dc) 
V w(k; 0; dc) since the politician can achieve V w(k; 0; dc) by making transfers to
consumers and equilibrium with b < 0 was already the worst possible, which
means that no additional loss of welfare will be possible. Furthermore, it cannot
be the case that V w(k; b; dc) > V w(k; 0; dc) when b > 0 since then there would
be a worst equilibrium where all households default.
Thus, the value of the worst sustainable equilibrium can only depend on the
initial level of capital.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
In the worst sustainable equilibrium, households beliefs about the following
subgame are manipulated to yield the worst possible payo¤s for the government.
As we have seen, in each period households make their decisions according to
uc(c; n)Fn(k; n)(1  n) + un(c; n) = 0
k0fuc(c; n)  uc(c0; n0)Fk(k0; n0)(1  k0)g = 0
ct + kt+1 = Rt(1  kt )kt + wt(1  nt )nt + Tt
Following Phelan and Stachetti (2001), dene z0 as the marginal value of
capital for households tomorrow z0  uc(c0; n0)Fk(k0; n0)(1  k0). The only way
to a¤ect households actions is by changing this value.
Let us now consider the governments problem when faced with a worst
sustainable equilibrium. Let V w(k) be the expected payo¤ of the worst sus-
tainable equilibrium when initial capital is k. Since the worst equilibrium the
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government can be given tomorrow is V w(k0), then the following equilibrium is
always available, which means that V w(k)  V (k; z0)
V (k; z0) = max
c;n;g;k0

u(c; n) + v(g) + V w(k0)
	
subject to m(c; n) + k0uc(c; n)  0
c+ g + k0 = F (k; n)
k0[uc(c; n)  z0] = 0:
Let z0 2 [z; z] be the values of z that can be sustained tomorrow. Then the
worst sustainable equilibrium must be given by:
V w(k) = min
z02[z;z]
V (k; z0):
From governments optimality we cannot have V w(k) < minV (k; z0):
Suppose V w(k) > minV (k; z0): Then this could not be the worst sustain-
able equilibrium since a lower payo¤ could be reached by giving consumers
expectations z0 = argminV (k; z0).
Since V (k; z0) is increasing in z0, it achieves its minima at the lower bound
z = 0. This means that consumers will expect capital to be taxed at con-
scatory rates tomorrow, which implies that there will be no investment in
capital. Furthermore, it will always be incentive compatible for the government
to expropriate capital. Thus, the default equilibrium is the worst sustainable
equilibrium.
7.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose that the allocation x is the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium
(; f; ). Consumer optimality requires that x maximizes the households utility
at time zero given the policies and prices along the equilibrium path. Govern-
ment optimality implies that the government must satisfy its budget constraints
from time zero on. Furthermore, in a sustainable equilibrium factor prices must
equal marginal productivity of factors and the resource constraint must hold
along the equilibrium path. Thus, the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium x
must be attainable under commitment, which means that condition (i) must
hold. At any time t, after history ht 1, if the government deviates from the
equilibrium path, it will get a payo¤ higher or equal to V d(kt). Government op-
timality requires that not deviating must yield a higher payo¤ than deviating,
which means that the present value of future prots must be at least as high as
V d(kt), which means that condition (ii) must hold at every time t. Thus, if an
allocation x is the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium (; f; ) it must meet
conditions (i) and (ii).
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Suppose now that an allocation x meets conditions (i) and (ii). Let  and
 be the policies and prices that implement this allocation under commitment.
Consider the following strategy for households: as long as the governments
action is according to , choose allocation x; if the government deviates, follow
the default equilibrium strategy. Likewise, consider the governments strategy
where it acts according to  along the equilibrium path and plays the default
strategies o¤ equilibrium. Finally, consider factor prices that are equal to the
marginal productivity of each factor of production for every possible history ht.
We will show that this is a sustainable equilibrium. First, consider histories
where there have been no deviations until time t. Since x is attainable under
equilibrium, and along the equilibrium path households will expect to face poli-
cies  and prices , this means that the continuation of x must be optimal for
consumers. The government, on the other hand, can choose to deviate, in which
case it would get V d(kt), or it can follow the equilibrium path. Since condition
(ii) ensures that the payo¤ along the equilibrium path is always higher than
V d(kt), then it is always incentive compatible for the government not to deviate.
Now, consider histories where there has been a deviation before time t. Our
strategy has specied that in this case both households and the government will
play a default equilibrium, which we have shown to be sustainable. Thus, the
specied set of strategies is a sustainable equilibrium that leads to outcome x.
7.5 Equivalence of Sequence and Recursive approaches
The Lagrangean for the sequence problem to nd the best sustainable equi-
librium can be written in the following way, where bt is the multiplier on the
implementability condition, bt is the multiplier on the resource constraint, andbt is the multiplier on incentive compatibility condition
n =
1P
t=o
t

u(ct; nt) + bt[m(ct; nt) + at+1   at]
 bt [ct + gt + kt+1   F (kt; nt)]

+
1P
i=1
ibi 1P
t=i
t iu(ct; nt)  V d(ki)

:
The rst order conditions for this problem are
uct(1 +
tP
i=1
bi) + btmct = bt
unt(1 +
tP
i=1
bi) + btmnt =  btFnt
bt+1Fkt+1   bt+1V dk (kt+1) = btbt+1 = bt:
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The rst order conditions for the recursive problem in section 4.2 are
uc + mc = 
un + mn =  Fn
vg = 
Va(a
0; k0)(1 + ) =  
Vk(a
0; k0) = = + [V dk (k
0)  Vk(a0; k0)]
and the envelope conditions for a and k are
Va(a; k) =  
Vk(a; k) = Fk(k; n):
It is easy to see that the equilibrium conditions for the two problems lead
to the same allocations for c, n, k, and a for as long as the multipliers for
the constraints in the recursive formulation , , and  have the following
relationship with the multipliers in the sequence approach:
 =
bt
1 +
Pt bi
 =
bt
1 +
Pt bi
1 +  =
1 +
Pt+1 bi
1 +
Pt bi :
Furthermore, the following transversality condition must be met in both
formulations
lim
t!1 
tV (kt; at) = 0:
Since the best sustainable equilibrium converges to a steady state, which
has positive and nite allocations, the transversality condition is met.
7.6 Impossibility of non zero capital taxes in steady state
We will now show that any steady state of the best sustainable equilibrium
must have zero capital taxes without imposing concavity of V (kt; at):
The idea is that if commitment were binding in the long run, then the
implementability condition would stop binding, and labor taxes would converge
to zero. But this can not be an optimal steady state, since it is optimal to take a
deviation where labor taxes are increased marginally (with zero rst order cost)
to increase government assets and make the incentive compatibility constraint
less binding (which has a positive rst order e¤ect).
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More formally, assume that there is a steady state where capital taxes are
di¤erent from zero. Let css; nss; gss; ass and kss be the allocations in this steady
state. In order to meet rst order conditions, these steady states must also have
constant multipliers ss; ss; ss. In steady state, the optimality condition for
capital becomes
ssFk(k
ss; nss) = ss= + ss[V dk (k
ss)  ssFk(kss; nss):
Given this we can only have capital taxes di¤erent from one and Fk(kss; nss) 6=
1 if ss > 0:
The optimality condition for a implies that
ss(1 + ss) = ss:
Thus, when ss > 0 we must have ss = 0.
But then the rst order conditions for consumption, labor and public spend-
ing take the following form
uc(c
ss; nss) = ss
un(c
ss; nss) =  ssFn(kss; nss)
v0(gss) = ss:
Furthermore, it must be true that
V (kss; ass) = V d(kss) < V (kss; a(kss)) = V fb(kss):
Now let us consider a departure from this steady state that will lead to
higher welfare than our original candidate for a steady state, thus implying
that it could not be an optimal solution to begin with. The departure is as
follows. In an initial period (let us call it period 0), starting from our initial
steady state, we will choose a1 = ass   a instead of ass and k1 = kss. The
new levels of consumption, labor and public spending are the solution to the
following problem
[c0; n0; g0] = argmax
c;n;g
[u(c; n) + v(g)]
subject to w(c; n) + (ass  a)  ass
c+ g + kss = F (kss; n):
First, let us check that this deviation is feasible. Clearly the implementabil-
ity condition and the resource constraint must be met, by construction of the
previous problem. The governments incentive compatibility condition now be-
comes
V (kss; ass  a)  V d(kss):
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Since V (k; a) cannot be increasing in a this condition must be met since
V (kss; ass) = V d(kss) in the original steady state.
Now we will show that taking this deviation has a zero cost up to a rst
order approximation. The new ow utility in period zero is given by
W (a j kss; ass) = max
c;n;g
[u(c; n) + v(g)]
subject to w(c; n) + (ass  a)  ass
c+ g + kss = F (kss; n):
We can write a rst order Taylor approximation of this expression in the
following way
W (a) =W (0) + aW 0(0):
Given that the implementability is not binding whena = 0; thenW (a) =
W (0), which means that the cost of this deviation is zero to a rst order ap-
proximation.
Let us now see if there is any benet to it. The deviation proceeds as
follows. From period 1 to period T   1 (which will be dened shortly), the
chosen allocations will be
ct = c
ss; nt = n
ss; gt = g
ss; kt = k
ss for t = 1:::T   1
at = a
ss   1 ta for t = 1:::T:
Let us start by checking that the new plan is feasible from periods 1 to T .
First, the resource constraint must be met since the allocations in this constraint
are the same as in the initial steady state. The incentive compatibility must
also hold since V (k; a) cannot be increasing in a. Finally, the implementability
condition will be met since w(css; nss)  ass(1 ), which implies that w(c; n)+
(ass    ta)  ass   1 ta.
Let T be dened by the following condition
a
1
T
= ass   a(kss):
This means that in period T we will reach at = a(kss) and will be able
to increase V (kss; a(kss)) > V (kss; ass) by switching to the non constrained
solution. Furthermore, this will lead to a rst order positive welfare increase in
the initial period
B(a) = T [V (kss; a(kss))  V (kss; ass)] = V (k
ss; a(kss))  V (kss; ass)
ass   a(kss) a:
Thus, the net benet of our deviation is strictly positive for a small enough
change in a, which means that the initial candidate for a steady state was not
optimal.
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